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Energy crises have become a regular feature of the relationship between Ukraine and 
Russia with far reaching effects on Russia’s European customers. While the energy connections 
between Moscow and Kyiv go back all the way to the Soviet time when Ukraine was receiving its 
energy supplies for free from the Soviet system, the breakup of the USSR made Ukraine an 
independent country with an ever increasing energy bill. In the 1990s when the Kyiv regime was 
Kremlin-friendly the system of price reductions was kept in place. However, the moment Kyiv 
showed any sign of foreign policy freedom, the country was reminded where its energy came 
from. This strategy was first applied in the winter of 1992/1993, shortly after Leonid Kuchma had 
won the Ukrainian presidency on a platform based on national values. The energy was stopped 
for  several  days,  allegedly  for  unpaid  Ukrainian  debts,  interrupting  the  gas  flow  to  Western 
Europe. The energy contracts and the debts were renegotiated and the Kuchma regime became 
much more close to the Kremlin.  
The greatest crisis to date came in 2006, when, after the Orange revolution changed 
dramatically the orientation of the Ukrainian government towards the West, the Kremlin decided 
to renegotiate the price that Kyiv was paying for its gas increasing it to world values. The gas 
stopped for 4 days creating deep worries in the European circles that were relying more and more 
on Russian energy, of which 80% crossed the Ukrainian territory. The truce of 2006 was only 
temporary, new gas deals being signed in March 2008, when the Kremlin turned off the gas taps 
again  in  order  to  facilitate  a  favorable  deal.  However,  this  time  the  deal  was  meant  to  be 
renegotiated at the end of that year, a new crisis looming on the horizon of 2009. As predicted 
this crisis occurred, this time far more severe than ever before. The gas flow was perturbed for 18 
days in the middle of a very harsh winter, creating Europe-wide outrage.  
This paper will focus on the 2009 energy crisis, tracing the context and the events that 
marked  the  crisis.  Secondly,  the  effects  of  these  events  will  be  analyzed  for  all  the  actors 
involved: Russia, Ukraine, as well as the European customers. Thirdly, the paper will test the 
possibility hat this could be a Russian strategy in the making, a way for the Kremlin to keep 
under its influence reluctant partners in the near abroad. The main focus of the paper will be to 
underline the creation of this strategy by following the events and the consequences of the 2009 
gas crisis.        
 
The context 
In November 2008 Russia and Ukraine started new negotiations on the price of the gas 
Kyiv was to import from Moscow. On December 24
th, Russia called on European nations to 
pressure Ukraine to guarantee the delivery of Russian natural gas to the continent. The appeal, 
made by Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, came as negotiators prepared to meet in Moscow in an 
attempt to resolve the politically tinged standoff. Russia and Ukraine had appeared close to a deal 
on a 2009 gas price for Ukraine on New Year's Eve, when talks broke down. Russia was arguing 
for a price of $250 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas, while Ukraine wanted a price of $201, up from 
$179.50 in 2008. Since January 1
st, Ukraine said it may be willing to pay $235, but Gazprom now 
wanted  $450  while  Kyiv  began  demanding  an  increase  in  the  transit  price  of  Gazprom  gas 
towards Europe. 
This new crisis came in a context of similar events that have many times disrupted the gas 
flow to Europe raising questions on energy security. In March 2008, Russia briefly reduced its 
supply of gas to Ukraine as a means to seal more quickly a gas deal for 2008’s imports. However, the gas crisis most present in European memory is the one in 2006 when for 4 days in January the 
gas cut to Europe severely disrupted the activity in many EU countries. However, in the case of 
this latest disagreement both the causes and the consequences could be more severe. This is due 
mostly to the context in which this new crisis occurred. 
At the beginning of the dispute talks were mainly focused on Gazprom's demands that 
Ukraine  pay  more  than  $600  million  in  late  fees  on  overdue  bills  and  a  new  gas  price.  Yet 
complicating the talks are charges of political motives by both sides. Ukrainian officials say the 
Kremlin is trying to weaken their pro-Western government, which is seeking NATO membership 
and backed Georgia in its August war against Russia. The Kremlin's relations with Ukraine have 
been strained since the 2004 street demonstrations known as the Orange Revolution, which resulted 
in a pro-Western government in the former Soviet republic that is seeking membership in NATO 
and  the  European  Union.  However,  ties  worsened  in  2008  after  Ukrainian  President  Viktor 
Yushchenko vocally backed Georgia in its August war with Russia. Putin later accused Ukraine of 
secretly supplying arms to Georgia before and soon after the fighting broke out. (Washington Post, 
January 8, 2009) 
Politics have also contributed to Ukraine's unwillingness to back down. Yushchenko's 
popularity had severely plunged before de 2009 gas crisis. He was also locked in a feud with his 
former Orange Revolution ally, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Each has accused the other of 
mishandling the gas dispute with Russia, and it is unclear who would have the final word over 
negotiations.  Yushchenko  and  Tymoshenko  issued  a  joint  statement  outlining  a  common 
bargaining position when the energy talks first collapsed in December, but Tymoshenko has said 
little in public about the gas dispute since, a sign that differences may remain. The most notable 
difference  being  the  decision  to  eliminate  the  role  of  shadowy  middleman  company 
RosUkrEnergo in Ukraine's purchases of gas from Russia, which Tymoshenko has described as a 
vehicle of corruption for Yushchenko.  
For  both  Russia  and  Ukraine  the  outcome  of  this  dispute  has  consequences  that  go 
beyond just the gas price. In Russia's case, a regain in regional power is extremely important 
especially in front of Ukraine that is actively seeking to enter Western organizations such as the 
EU and NATO. In the context of the growing economic crisis within the country, a victory on the 
international level is crucial for the political support of the regime in Moscow. Moreover, as the 
oil  price  has  been  dropping  constantly,  gas  revenues  might  end  up  representing  the  most 
important revenue for the Russian state. Similarly, Ukraine also sought a victory in this crisis as 
the country had been one of the most affected economies in Eurasia by the current economic 
downturn. Even with the loans offered by the international organizations such as IMF, Kyiv does 
not have the means to pay for the gas debt and it cannot afford a double fold increase of its gas 
price. Therefore both countries started this dispute knowing that the outcome is crucial for their 
economies.  
 
How it happened 
Russian gas monopoly OAO Gazprom cut off gas exports to Ukraine on January 1
st after 
talks with Ukraine's Naftogaz Ukrainy failed to set a new gas price for 2009. Gazprom continued 
delivery of gas for downstream users in the EU, which gets about 80% of its Russian gas imports 
via Ukraine and depends on Russia for a quarter of its gas needs, but did not send the amount of 
gas  Ukraine  usually  takes  for  its  own  consumption.  Soon  after  this  gas  reduction,  European 
countries signaled a drop in their contracted gas quantities, which in turn led to accusations from 
Moscow that Kyiv is stealing Europe-bound gas.  
To  this,  Putin  retaliated  by  ordering  Gazprom  chief  executive  Aleksei  Miller  to  cut 
volumes of natural gas shipped through Ukraine towards Europe by amounts equivalent to those 
Moscow has accused Ukraine of stealing, expecting Kyiv to supplement this quantity by the 
amounts it took. The Gazprom chief executive said in a conversation with Prime Minister Putin 
broadcast on Russian state television that Gazprom would reduce exports bound for Western Europe through Ukrainian pipes by the same amount that it accused Ukraine of diverting. Miller 
also said Gazprom would instead increase gas deliveries to Europe through Belarus and the Blue-
Stream pipeline under the Black Sea. (Radio Free Europe, January 5, 2009) 
In spite of these Russian efforts to supplement exports through alternative routes, on 
January 6
th Bulgarian and Turkish authorities said that Russia had completely suspended their gas 
supplies. The Bulgarian Energy Ministry said that its gas supplies were suspended early Tuesday, 
including  gas  intended  for  transit  to  Turkey,  Greece  and  Macedonia.  Bulgaria  gets  the  vast 
majority of its gas from Russia, and had only a few days of supply in reserve. The Turkish energy 
minister, Hilmi Guler, told reporters in Ankara that the Russian gas from a pipeline that transits 
Ukraine had been completely cut. But Turkey was seeking to increase deliveries of Russian gas 
via a Black Sea pipeline which links Russia and Turkey through the Black Sea, he said. In 
Prague, the Czech pipeline operator RWE Transgas said the flow of gas “delivered by the transit 
pipeline system through the Ukraine and Slovakia to the Czech republic and other EU countries 
has dropped significantly.” It said it would increase purchases of Norwegian gas delivered via 
another pipeline. (New York Times, January 6, 2009) 
A  delegation  from  the  European  Union  was  to  meet  Ukrainian  officials  in  Kyiv  on 
January 6, and fact-finding talks were also planned between EU officials and Gazprom, though 
the venue had not yet been confirmed. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said 
on January 5 he had appealed to Putin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko not to let 
their dispute affect Europe’s gas supplies. "I hope that the matter will be resolved, as the reality is 
that if it is not then it may create problems for European countries who are not responsible for the 
situation," he said. (Radio Free Europe, January 6, 2009) 
Russia’s  state-controlled  gas  export  monopoly  Gazprom  fully  suspended  supplies  of 
transit gas towards Ukraine on January 7, saying there was no longer any point delivering the gas 
because Kyiv had shut down the pipelines. On January 8, the two top gas executives from Russia 
and Ukraine held talks in Moscow, in the first face-to-face contact since their row began, but no 
immediate result emerged. (Radio Free Europe, January 8, 2009)  
The European Commission sought to offer its assistance in the crisis. The offer to send 
observers was a measure of the desperation gripping the EU. Any observer mission in the former 
Soviet Union is fraught with complications, and it is only with great reluctance that the EU 
undertakes  monitoring  duties  in  any  given  dispute.  Ferran  Tarradellas,  the  European 
Commission's energy spokesman, said the EU was ready to do "whatever it takes" to ensure gas 
supplies resume, including manning the pipelines with its own monitors. The president of the 
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, personally called Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin 
of Russia and Yulia Tymoshenko of Ukraine in order to solve the crisis. At a press conference in 
Prague, Barroso hinted at some of the difficulty the EU has had in dealing with the two sides. 
The European Union's efforts to restore natural-gas supplies from Russia stumbled on 
Moscow's decision not to turn on the taps until its own experts were included in an international 
mission  to  monitor  Ukraine’s  gas-transit  system.  Putin  was  dismissive  of  Ukraine’s  political 
leadership, describing it as corrupt and unable to make decisions. However, while Ukrainian 
officials signed an agreement on the 8
th to accept monitoring of the country's gas-transit system 
by EU experts, they wouldn’t accept Russian monitors. This made the Russian leadership to 
refuse any restart of the gas flow to Europe's disappointment.  
The European efforts did bring about an agreement on January 12. Under the trilateral 
agreement, experts from the three parties were supposed to monitor transit operations at both 
Russian and Ukrainian facilities. The breakthrough began on Saturday, when the Czech prime 
minister, Mirek Topolanek, whose country was holding the rotating presidency of the European 
Union, met for hours of talks with the Russian Prime Minister outside Moscow and secured 
Russia’s agreement. Mr. Topolanek then flew to Kyiv, Ukraine, late that night to meet with 
Ukrainian leaders. Early Sunday, the Ukrainian Prime Minister of Ukraine emerged from talks 
with Mr. Topolanek to say her country had signed the protocol.  The European Union showed growing frustration with Russia and Ukraine as efforts to 
restore the supply of Russian natural gas failed again, even after an agreement was signed by all 
parties. Moscow said it couldn’t restart gas flow because of a Ukrainian declaration Sunday that it 
would tap Russia’s EU-bound gas exports – and pay for it later – in order to pump those exports 
across its territory. Russia considers that to be theft. The declaration, issued alongside a signed 
agreement setting up a monitoring mission for Ukraine's pipeline system, also blamed Russia for 
the gas cutoff to the EU. (Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2009) The reason why this initial deal 
failed  is  because  Russia  did  not  offered  Ukraine  the  kind  of  long-term  deal  enjoyed  by  its 
customers in Western Europe, which might settle the dispute for good. 
In spite of growing frustration the European side showed great restraint in its declarations. 
Jose-Manuel Barroso stressed that he was not casting blame in the transit dispute. Other European 
leaders have also avoided placing the blame on a specific country. "I have no ambition to sort out 
Russian-Ukrainian  relations  right  now.  It  was  not  established  as  my  goal,"  Topolanek,  whose 
country took over the EU presidency on January 1
st, said Saturday at the news conference with 
Putin. French President Nicolas Sarkozy called the dispute a "bilateral matter" at a joint news 
conference  with  German  Chancellor  Angela  Merkel.  Only  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  Ferenc 
Gyurcsany said that it was unacceptable for "the bullets that Ukraine and Russia shoot at each other 
to hit Hungary".(The Moscow Times, January 13) 
In  the  end,  on  January  13  Russia  started  pumping  transit  gas  destined  for  European 
consumers into Ukraine for the first time since a contract dispute left Europe short of fuel in 
freezing  temperatures.  Yet  the  agreement  collapsed  soon  after.  With  EU  monitors  along  the 
pipeline to make sure that Ukraine did not divert any gas for its own use, Russia agreed to resume 
shipments to Europe. But rather than repressuring the Ukrainian pipeline system for exports, 
Russia’s gas monopoly, Gazprom, ordered a single test shipment to see if it would pass through 
Ukraine to Europe through a pipeline that was being used to supply the Ukrainian city of Odessa. 
Ukrainian authorities refused to open that particular pipeline, saying they did not want to cut 
supplies  to  the  entire  city  of  Odessa,  and  Russia  again  halted  shipments.  (Christian  Science 
Monitor, January 13, 2009) 
Ukrainian energy adviser Bohdan Sokolovsky said Russia deliberately shipped the gas 
along a technically arduous route that requires Ukraine to cut out domestic consumers before it 
can deliver gas to the Balkans. He said a gas entry point on the Russian border at Sudzha and a 
gas pumping station near the Romanian border where Gazprom wants its gas delivered are not 
linked by an export pipeline. Medvedev insisted that Russia deliberately chose Sudzha because it 
is an export pipeline with direct access to nations hit hard in the dispute, including Bulgaria, 
Romania and Turkey.  
Moreover, in this context of mutual distrust, Aleksandr Medvedev, Gazprom’s deputy chief 
executive, raised a new allegation, saying that Ukraine had been taking orders from Washington 
after the United States and Ukraine signed a partnership agreement in December that included a 
clause on energy cooperation. Medvedev did not explain why the United States would seek to 
disrupt relations, not to speak of the gas supply. In a statement, the United States Embassy in 
Moscow said that the allegation was “baseless.” (Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 2009) 
This new cut made two of the worst hit EU states, Bulgaria and Slovakia to send their 
Prime Ministers to Moscow and Kyiv on January 14 in a renewed attempt to reach an agreement. 
(Radio Free Europe, January 14, 2009) Moreover, Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso 
said  he  would  advise  EU  energy  companies  to  sue  the  two  companies  responsible  unless 
Gazprom and Naftogaz moved fast to restore supplies. He said if agreements, sponsored by the 
European Union, are not observed "as a matter of urgency", he would advise energy companies 
that have deals with Gazprom and Naftogaz, to file lawsuits against them. (BBC, January 15, 
2009) 
On  January  16,  senior  officials  from  Eastern  Europe  have  gathered  in  the  Ukrainian 
capital Kyiv for a meeting with President Viktor Yushchenko aimed at ending his country's gas row  with  Russia.  The  talks,  which  brought  together  some  of  Moscow’s  toughest  Eastern 
European critics, was organized with unusual speed and secrecy and announced just hours before 
it  began.  Participants  include  Polish  President  Lech  Kaczynski,  Lithuanian  President  Valdas 
Adamkus, Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic, and Moldovan Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii, 
according to a Ukrainian statement. (Radio Free Europe, January 16, 2009) 
On January 18, the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine agreed to a resolution of their 
countries’ gas dispute with an understanding that Ukraine will pay prices for Russian gas pegged to 
the price of oil, as is the practice in Western Europe. Under the agreement, however, Ukraine will 
pay a price substantially similar to what authorities in Kyiv had offered before the dispute escalated 
into a 12-day cutoff of heating fuel to large parts of Europe. The two parties agreed that Ukraine 
would buy gas from Russia at a 20 percent discount to prices paid by Gazprom's customers in 
Europe, which are expected to fall sharply this year. These customers, such as the German utility 
E.On or Gaz de France, are expected to pay an average of between $260 and $300 for 1,000 cubic 
meters of natural gas in 2009, according to estimates by Gazprom. Thus, under the agreement, 
Ukraine would pay between $208 and $240 for natural gas. (New York Times, January 18, 2009) 
At the ceremony of signing the 10-year contract, Russian officials said gas would start 
flowing again soon across Ukraine to Europe, but the European Union said it would not consider 
the crisis over until its monitors register gas arriving at the bloc's borders. (Moscow Times, 
January 10, 2009) 
 
Effects in Europe 
In Austria, where about 60% of demand is met by Russian gas, the energy flow stopped 
on January 7. German energy groups E.On and Wingas were relying on gas stores and a transit 
route via Poland. Gas shipments to Europe via Ukraine were massively reduced since early on 
January 6.  
In Turkey production at three power stations stopped on the 8th. Russian gas supplies 
from the western pipeline passing through Ukraine were cut on the 6th. The country has raised 
supplies of Russian gas delivered via a pipeline under the Black Sea. Gazprom’s Blue Stream 
pipeline to Turkey was working at its full capacity of 45 million cubic meters. Also, Iran raised 
the amount of its daily supply volumes to Turkey to 18 million cubic meters from 12 million, 
following the partial cutoff of Russian gas. 
Greece depends on 82% of its gas consumption on Russia. All Russian gas supplies via 
Ukraine to Greece were halted on January 6. Turkey's gas exports to Greece were below the 
contract  level  with  low  pressure  on  the  pipeline.  However,  Greece,  a  latecomer  to  creating 
infrastructure to supply gas to households, was better placed to ride out the Russia-Ukraine gas 
crisis than some of its neighbors as the country continues to rely on oil for heating and power 
production. According to the Greek gas company Depa, natural gas accounts for about 20 percent 
of Greece's energy needs, with about 9 million cubic meters per day needed to cover domestic 
demand. About 5 million to 6 million cubic meters come from Russia, via Ukraine and then 
Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. 
In Italy, about 28% of the gas demand is met by Moscow. Although gas imports were 
substantially interrupted, Italy has tapped its gas reserves. France also suffered a 70% drop in 
shipments, but France does not rely on gas in the same way as Germany or Italy because 80 
percent of its electricity is produced by nuclear power stations. 
Hungary is a about 60% dependent on Russia for its gas. For the duration of the crisis, 
E.On Ruhrgas was to supply Hungary with 2.5 million cubic meters of gas per day via a pipeline 
from Austria. Hungary's MOL and Germany's E.ON Ruhrgas were to export 4 million to 4.5 
million cubic meters of gas via Hungary to Serbia and 1 million to 1.5 million cubic meters to 
Bosnia. The two were to make a joint shipment of 1 million cubic meters to Croatia via Austria.  
Czech Republic's gas demand is 80% dependent on Russia. During the gas cut, the main 
transit pipeline from Russia to the Czech Republic and Western Europe was shut on January 7. No customers have suffered any shortfall, said the dominant gas firm RWE Transgas, a unit of 
Germany's RWE. The firm said it had about 1.9 billion cubic meters of gas in storage, enough to 
supply Czech firms and households for several weeks unless the weather was extremely cold. 
There were no plans at present to reduce supply to industrial customers. Consumption is about 50 
million cubic meters on an average winter day. The country imported around 17 million cubic 
meters per day from Norway and Russia via Germany, more than standard shipments coming 
through the link only from Norway. The Czech Republic will provide about 4 million cubic 
meters of gas per day to Slovakia. Slovakia said it would restart a nuclear power plant unit it shut 
down in 2008 because the cutoff of Russian gas supplies threatened to cause power blackouts. It 
will resume power production at the 440-megawatt unit of the Jaslovske Bohunice plant in less 
than six days, the country's prime minister said on January 10. 
 
Other consequences of the crisis 
As the most immediate consequence of the crisis one only needs to look at the 3.3% jump 
in US heating prices in the first days of the disruption, Europe expecting harder increases. Also, 
in a move that suggested the crisis may encourage EU states to reduce their reliance on Russian 
gas, Poland said it would press ahead with plans to build one or two nuclear power plants. (BBC, 
January 15, 2009) Slovakia also said it would reopen a nuclear power plant unit closed under its 
EU accession agreement. In the middle of the worse energy cuts in Europe, Bulgaria expressed a 
similar wish to rely more on nuclear power.  
Also, the crisis deepened the political situation of Ukraine. The opposition parties in the 
Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, have repeated calls for the government's resignation and a start to 
impeachment proceedings against the president over a row with Russia that has left the country 
13 days without gas supplies. Viktor Yanukovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, the main 
opposition party, proposed a debate on holding a vote of no confidence in the government for 
January 15 but no motion has been put on the agenda yet. The government of Yulia Tymoshenko 
has already survived such a vote when it was taken in July 2008. (Radio Free Europe, January 13, 
2009) 
 
A Russian energy strategy in the making  
In the 2006 crisis, the entire European continent accused Russia of exerting the “energy 
weapon”  on  Ukraine  for  the  mere  fact  that  Kyiv  has  changed  allegiances  and  that  the  new 
“Orange” government was seeking a European-centered foreign policy. In the past 3 years the 
Kremlin has shifted its strategy. 
The Kremlin and  Gazprom  have  learned  the  importance  and  tricks  of  PR. This time 
around, Moscow began an information offensive well in advance, way before it became clear that 
it  was  again  on  a  collision  course  with  Kyiv  over  gas  prices.  In  November  2008,  Moscow 
launched a well-orchestrated campaign to inform Europe about a possible collapse of gas talks 
with Ukraine. Gazprom and the Russian government provided daily updates of information on the 
status  of  talks  over debt repayment,  making  it  clear  how this  might  affect the  future  of  gas 
deliveries to and through Ukraine.  
By  December,  when  it  became  clear  that  Ukraine  was  likely  to  provoke  a  crisis  by 
disrupting supplies to Europe, top Gazprom officials went on an offensive in Western media. 
Gazprom  deputy  head  Aleksandr  Medvedev,  one  of  the  country's  best  communicators,  was 
dispatched to tour European capitals to deliver Gazprom and the Kremlin's side of the story. 
Gazprom acted preemptively by inviting Britain-based SGS, a leading energy auditing 
company, to its gas pumping installations at the points of entry and exit from Ukraine, providing 
early documented proof of Ukraine’s wrongdoing. Gazprom also wasted no time in filing a legal 
complaint with the Stockholm Arbitration Court against Ukraine’s Naftogaz for breach of the gas 
transit contract. During the 2009 crisis, emphasis on the commercial nature of the dispute was timely 
shifted to Ukraine's breach of contractual obligations as a transit country, including under the 
Protocol of the European Energy Charter to ensure uninterrupted Russian gas deliveries to Europe 
under any circumstances. Discussion of the need for alternative energy routes bypassing Ukraine, 
like the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines, has been reinvigorated as more prominent 
European politicians endorsed the proposals. 
It was also a big diplomatic coup for Russia to drag the EU into direct mediation and 
monitoring of Ukraine’s fulfillment of its transit obligations. This immediately made Ukraine 
look  like  the  chief  culprit  and  forced  Kyiv  to  come  up  with  bizarre  explanations  that  only 
reinforced the sense of Ukraine's culpability. 
During  this  crisis,  the  Russian  Prime  Minister  Vladimir  Putin  became  the  principal 
spokesman for the crisis. This had the immediate effect of drawing media attention to Russia’s 
side  of  the  story.  President  Dimitry  Medvedev  played  the  backstage  role  of  someone  who 
ultimately looks after the country's vital interests while delegating authority for hands-on crisis 
management. 
The investment in sophisticated PR capabilities paid off. During "Ukrainian Gas Crisis - 
2009", few Western newspapers and television programs described Russia as a bully wielding its 
"energy weapon" and trying to bring down a burgeoning Ukrainian democracy. (Moscow Times, 
January 13, 2009) The success of this strategy show up mainly in the European reaction. Instead 
of objecting to Russia’s pipeline politics, Europe says it was a "commercial dispute [that] has to 
be solved by the two parties". (Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2009) 
This view brings many problems to Europe’s future. By viewing Moscow as the reliable 
partner, hindered only by a capricious Kyiv, may lead Europeans to believe that what they really 
need are more direct gas links to Russia. The chief options mooted are the Nord Stream pipeline 
across the Baltic Sea to Germany and the South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea to Bulgaria. 
Nord  Stream,  which  is  designed  to  circumvent  Poland,  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania,  is 
Moscow’s energy version of dividing and conquering Central and Eastern Europe. As for South 
Stream, it has eroded EU’s resolve to complete the Nabucco pipeline that would cross Turkey and 
the Balkans, routing Central Asian gas around Russia rather than through it. As the Europeans 
weigh these projects, the Kremlin has been striking deals with the very Central Asian countries 
that could supply Nabucco or other non-Russian pipelines. Diversifying Europe’s gas sources is 
more important than varying the transit countries between the EU and Gazprom's fields.  
Europe’s energy security is also threatened by Gazprom's failure to invest adequately in 
its production capacity, which is widely forecast to begin falling next year. Natural gas prices are 
linked with oil prices, and the windfall of the past couple of years is coming to an end now that 
crude prices have fallen back to earth. The credit crunch, along with Russia's unpredictability for 
foreign investors, means money won't necessarily pour in from the outside as it did over the past 
decade. (Wall Street Journal) 
 
Future pipelines and the crisis with Ukraine 
Top  Russian  officials,  including  Prime  Minister  Vladimir  Putin,  have  said  the  crisis 
proves that Europe should back two Russian gas pipeline projects – Nord Stream and South 
Stream – that would bypass Ukraine, running directly to the EU under the Baltic and Black seas. 
The EU has backed Nord Stream, saying it will enhance the Continent's energy security. But the 
project has faced stiff opposition in some quarters of the EU, which suspect the project is a ploy 
to free Russia’s hand in using the gas tap to influence its ex-Communist neighbors. Construction 
of  the  pipeline’s  first  phase  was  delayed  from  this  year  to  2010,  after  some  EU  countries 
requested more assessments of the project's environmental impact. (Wall Street Journal, January 
12, 2009) 
Putin said on January 2009 that construction of Nord Stream, scheduled to come online in 
2011, would be a guarantee against supply disruptions in the future. "The current crisis confirms that there is a need for a true diversification of the ways to deliver our energy resources to the 
main consumers in Europe," Putin said at a joint news conference with Czech Prime Minister 
Mirek  Topolanek  in  Moscow.  Putin  also  suggested building  the  less-advanced  South  Stream 
across the Black Sea and southern Europe and moving ahead with plans to liquefy gas – or chill it 
into a liquid – to ship by tankers worldwide. 
Russia has gone to great lengths to defend its position in the dispute, and EU reactions are 
more muted this time than in January 2006, when the West accused Moscow of using energy as a 
weapon by cutting off gas supplies through Ukraine. "If Ukraine wants to be closer to the EU, it 
should not create any problems for gas to come to the EU," Barroso told a news conference in 
Prague, where he was meeting Czech officials who hold the rotating presidency of the 27-nation 
EU. (Moscow Times, January 12, 2009) 
 
Conclusions 
The general elections in February 2010 in Ukraine changed the much hated pro-Western 
Orange government with the pro-Russian leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor Yanukovych. 
The change in the Russian attitude was almost immediate. As Yanukovych is reversing many of 
the actions bringing Ukraine closer to the West and getting the country back in the good graces of 
the Kremlin, the energy sector also has followed this trend of changes. This makes future energy 
stand-offs  such  as  those  in  2006  and  2009  much  less  likely.  However,  in  spite  of  excellent 
Russian-Ukrainian relations, Europe remains painfully aware of its dependency of Russian gas. 
Although the EU member states have set for themselves bold goals that would ensure quick 
diversification and greater security of their energy needs, there is little concrete progress to date. 
Each  state  is  still  acting  unilaterally,  first  and  foremost  concerned  about  securing  their  own 
energy needs in a quick, reliable and cheap manner, often ignoring longer-term and political 
implications.  
Russia under Putin’s leadership has fully understood the power of energy monopoly and 
their continued hold over the European markets for the Kremlin’s longer-term political, economic 
and strategic goals. With Russia acting as one and dealing with 27 countries on a bilateral basis, 
instead of under a single EU flag, Moscow has easily maneuvered itself into all the strategic 
energy  projects  and  assets  ranging  from  gas  storage  to  electricity  distribution.  Over  the  last 
decade Russia has systematically moved to maintain, and when possible, increase, the level of 
European dependency by building new infrastructure projects on the one hand and preventing 
other major suppliers from the east such as Azerbaijan or the Central Asian countries to compete 
with  Moscow  in  Europe.  To  this  end  projects  such  as  Nord  Stream  and  South  Stream  are 
strategically built in order to saturate the European market with gas ensuring the double goal of 
keeping a strong grip on a valuable source of revenue for the Russian economy and of eliminating 
alternative projects to Europe such as Nabucco. At the same time, Russia is forming the Gas 
Exporting  Countries  Forum  –  the  infamous  Gas  OPEC  –  to  bring  together  Algeria,  Bolivia, 
Brunei, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, Trinidad and 
Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela – Kazakhstan and Norway are observers – so  
all gas reaching European markets from the south would be controlled by Russia and its allies.  
Russia may seem to be unstoppable on this path of increased consolidation, yet there are 
finally signs that more and more people within the EU member countries are uncomfortable to 
live with this tight bear hug. Russia’s often aggressive actions in the international sphere are 
increasingly pushing the reluctant EU countries to come together to back alternative projects to 
Russian  and  Russian-controlled  routes.  The  current  economic  crisis  has  slowed  down  many 
projects and provided new opportunities to reconsider them thus offering Europe a new chance at 
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